Epistemic Virtues and Vices of Philosophy Students in the Evaluations of Professors at the Imperial Kazan University (Based on Reviews of Prize-Winning Essays from 1913-1916)

Abstract

The article examines the academic ethos of pre-revolutionary philosophy at Kazan University through an analysis of professors’ reviews of students’ prize-winning essays from 1913–1916. The study is based on the methodology of the «moral economy» of science, which involves studying the informal values and practices of a scholarly community. The primary focus is on reconstructing the system of epistemic virtues and vices that shaped the normative boundaries of the professional community. The analysis reveals two interconnected groups of virtues. The foundation consisted of «reliabilist» virtues ensuring knowledge reliability: philological accuracy, meticulous work with primary sources, methodological correctness, and stylistic clarity. These underpinned «responsibilist» virtues aimed at generating new understanding: critical autonomy, methodological reflection, interdisciplinary boldness, and independent problem-setting. The hierarchy of vices, such as superficiality, stylistic imperfection, and factual errors, was constructed as a strict antithesis to these virtues. Thus, the academic ethos of the Kazan philosophical school represented an integrated system that combined the reproduction of classical «normal science» standards with the encouragement of intellectual responsibility and the creative development of norms.